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SINcE several of his senior brethren devoted well over one hundred and fifty
pages of the United States Reports to discussing the issues thought to be pre-
sented in Baker v. Carr, Mr. Justice Stewart can hardly be charged .ith gar-
rulousness in claiming two pages more. The central thrust of his concurring
opinion was to remind the nation what it was the Supreme Court had explicitly
decided and the limited character of that decision:
The Court today decides three things and no more:
"(a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that
a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be
entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) ... that the appellants have stand-
ing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes."'
Rendered into ordinary English, the Court's holding apparently came to this:
Appellants are Tennessee citizens eligible to vote for members of the
General Assembly. Pursuant to the sixty-year old Tennessee apportion-
ment formula,.the voting districts to which appellants belong are-so appel-
lants allege-allotted significantly fewer representatives in the Assembly
than other voting districts of comparable population. In a great many in-
stances, the alleged differences in representation seem to correspond with
differences in the character of the voting districts, in the sense that pre-
dominantly rural districts fare far better than predominantly urban dis-
tricts. (But it also appears-as Mr. Justice Clark observes in his concurr-
ing opinion-that the apportionment formula "discriminates horizontally,
creating gross disparities between rural areas themselves as well as betveen
urban areas themselves... ."2) Under-representation in the General As-
sembly means that appellants, and those similarly situated, are disadvan-
taged in that they have, voter for voter, markedly less influence on state
policy than voters in more favored districts.
In the face of a motion to dismiss, the alleged disparities in voting
strength-initially the product of state legislative action, and thereafter per-
petuated by state legislative inaction-must be assumed to exist. Dis-
parity in treatment at the hands of state officials is not, of itself, action-
able. But where the complaint adequately recites: (1) that disparity in
treatment works significant disadvantage; and (2) that the basis for the
disparate treatment is either (a) simply irrational, or (b) based on
value preferences not open to a state to indulge in; then the complaint
states a case under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and is, in consequence, good against a motion to dismiss. And so
here the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded for
trial.
-Professor of Law, Yale Law School
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 265 (1962).
2. Id. at 256.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
If this is a fair exposition of what the Court meant in Baker v. Carr, why
did the dissenters regard it as such radical doctrine? What made the decision,
in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words, "a massive repudiation of the experience
of our whole past ...... ? And was the Court really "asserting destructively
novel judicial power.. . ." 4
Certainly Baker v. Carr opens up unfamiliar judicial vistas. It signifies a
sharp increase in judicial readiness to inquire into the architecture of the
legislative establishment-certainly at the state, and perhaps even at the
congressional, level. In announcing its readiness to inquire the Court has
deliberately disengaged itself from doctrines which, starting with Colegrove
v. Green 5 in 1946, had prevailed for the fifteen years prior to Baker v. Carr.
In Colegrove the Court had declined to examine the marked discrepancies
in population between Illinois' urban and rural congressional districts. There-
after, in 1948, the Court refused to disturb an Illinois statute which barred
new political parties from the state-wide ballot unless they could recruit 25,000
adherents, including a minimum of 200 in at least 50 of the state's 102 coun-
ties, notwithstanding the vast population differences between Chicago's Cook
County, which has over half the state's registered voters, and the down-state,
rural counties.6 And in 1950 the Court was unmoved by an attempt to test the
"county unit" system governing the Georgia primaries (Georgia's only mean-
ingful elections) 7 under which the winner of each county's popular vote
received that county's entire "county unit," the units being allocated among
the counties by a formula which enormously inflated the sparsely populated
rural counties at the expense of counties embracing dense urban centers such
as Atlanta.8
Underlying these decisions not to inquire further were two judicial themes.
One sounded like a proposition of substantive constitutional law:
It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such
broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the
laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political
initative as between its thinly populated counties and those having con-
centrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical oppor-
tunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the
former.9
The other was an assertion of the inappropriateness of judicial inquiry :
[T] his controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and
active relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues
3. Id. at 267.
4. Ibid.
5. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
6. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
7. Cf. Smith v. Alhvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Texas) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941) (Louisiana) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cecr,
denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (South Carolina).
8. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
9. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948).
[Vol. 72: 81
"THE POLITICS OF THE PEOPLE"
this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system
to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less
pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest
be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law. * * * Courts ought not
to enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is
to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the
ample powers of Congress. 0
The two judicial themes worked together to justify abstention.
This was the judicial strain which the Court, in Baker v. Carr, declined to
follow. But it is not quite accurate to say that the Court thereby broke wholly
new ground. For there is another, and a longer, line of cases, some of recent
vintage, in which the Court took it upon itself to "enter [a] political thicket."
To be sure, the cases announcing the right of Negroes to participate equally
with whites in the southern electoral process-the cases starting with Niron
v. Herndon,'1 running through the "white primary" cases, Snith v. All-
wright, 2 and Terry v. Adams,'3 and culminating two terms back in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot,14 which challenged Alabama's attempted mutilation of the City of
Tuskegee--involve another sort of "political thicket." But even if this differ-
ent sort of thicket inhabits another part of the constitutional forest, isn't it the
same forest? Or is this thicket, as the dissenters in Baker v. Carr suggest, a
rara arbor growing at some wholly isolated level of constitutional discourse?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the author of the Court's opinions in Cole-
grove and in Gomillion. For him (and for Mr. Justice Harlan, who joined his
Baker v. Carr dissent), the irrelevance of the Negro disenfranchisement cases
to the problems posed in Baker v. Carr was plain:
The cases involving Negro disfranchisement are no exception to the
principle of avoiding federal judicial intervention into matters of state
government in the absence of an explicit and clear constitutional impera-
tive. For here the controlling command of Supreme Law is plain and un-
equivocal. An end of discrimination against the Negro was the compelling
motive of the Civil War Amendments. The Fifteenth expresses this in
terms, and it is no less true of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth.Y
With a portion of this analysis there can be no quarrel. Of course it is true
that "[a] n end of discrimination against the Negro was the compelling motive
of the Civil War Amendments." But it is also true that the equal protection
10. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54, 556 (1946). The reference to congres-
sional power in Colegrove presumably relates to the fact that the malapportionment there
challenged was in Illinois' congressional districts; possibly Congress could also cope with
cognate vices whose impact is confined to non-federal elections by.invoking its power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and/or its article IV obligation to guarantee to each
state a republican form of government.
11. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
12. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
13. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
14. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
15. 369 U.S. at 285-86.
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clause has been found applicable to a whole host of other invidious or irra-
tional discriminations. However, the Baker v. Carr dissenters regard govern-
mental discrimination against Negroes as peculiarly deserving of judicial
scrutiny because, in the fourteenth as well as in the fifteenth amendment, "the
controlling mandate of the Supreme Law is plain and unequivocal." Judicial
recognition of the fourteenth amendment's primary purpose, and judicial
commitment to fulfill that purpose in vigorous fashion, are of course highly
appropriate. And the appropriate corollary of that recognition and commit-
ment is that, as against challenges to other forms of official discrimination,
a challenge to state-imposed disabilities attaching to Negroes, qua Negroes,
is the easiest sort of equal protection case to frame. But isn't that as far as
the distinction should carry? Surely the fact that the constitutional mandate
is plainer and less equivocal in an instance of anti-Negro discrimination than
in others doesn't make such a claim more justiciable than other equal pro-
tection claims; it simply makes a justiciable law suit easier to win.
It may well be that the framers of the fourteenth amendment anticipated
congressional, not judicial, enforcement of its commands. So much, at all
events, seems indicated by Professor Alexander M. Bickel's researches.1 0 But
the Supreme Court early assumed major responsibility for enforcing the
amendment, and not only in instances of anti-Negro discrimination. It is not
entirely clear, therefore, what logic would support a double standard of justici-
ability, under which the federal courts would process all equal protection
cases except those in the realm of suffrage, and in that one realm would find
that only a complaint challenging anti-Negro discrimination could rise to the
dignity of a "case" or "controversy."17
Actually, it is none too clear that the Baker v. Carr dissenters really meant
to insist on so narrow a canon of justiciability in voting cases. Thus, they
found it sufficient that Baker v. Carr was
. . . not a case in which a State has, through a device however oblique
and sophisticated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote,
or given them only a third or a sixth of a vote. That was Gontillion v.
Lightfoot .... What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread
method of representation-representation by local geographic division,
only in part respective of population-in preference to others, others,
forsooth, more appealing. Appellants contest this choice and seek to
make this Court the arbiter of the disagreement. They would make the
Equal Protection Clause the charter of adjudication ... 18
16. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 UAiy. L.
REv. 1, 64 (1955).
17. Distinctions taken between cases arising under the fourteenth amendment and
those arising under the fifteenth will not support such a double standard. Smith v.
Allwright, Terry v. Adams and Gomillion v. Lightfoot seem to have been decided under
the latter amendment, but Nixon v. Herndon and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932),
were fourteenth amendment cases. See Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Jtdicial In-
tegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REY. 1, 22 (1959),
18. 369 U.S. at 300.
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The dissenters seem to have been saying that a complaint charging the
diminution of the voting rights of Jews, qua Jews, or redheaded persons, qua
redheaded persons, would have stated a justiciable claim. But why so? Confining
the franchise to Gentiles (or Protestants) has not been a significant aspect of
our political arrangements for a century-and-a-half; but it is assuredly an "old"
-one might even say a rational---"method of representation."10 Disenfranchis-
ing, or qualifying the franchise, of redheaded people would seem a novel, and
prima facie irrational, "method of representation" (although in all likelihood-
unless achieved by a Gomillion-type subterfuge-it would be adopted as a state
policy only after some attempt at demonstration of the reasonableness of the
proposed distinction 20). But if these are cases in which the Supreme Court
could serve as "the arbiter of the disagreement" and use "the Equal Protec-.
tion Clause as the charter of adjudication," what touchstone of justiciability
should cause the Court to stay its hand from ordering a trial in Baker v.
Carr?
Does not the answer lie elsewhere than in a quest for standards of justici-
ability? Does not the answer lie in the dissenters' apparent view that on the
merits, taking their complaint at full value, the appellants in Baker v. Carr
should not prevail? Were not the dissenters really resolving the justiciability
question by reference to the Court's prior reading of the equal protection
clause as a concept which did not "deny a State the power to assure a proper
diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and
those having concentrated masses . ,, ?21
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker v. Carr did not reject this
constitutional generalization. And each of the three concurring opinions-that
of Mr. Justice Douglas, that of Mr. Justice Clark, and that of Mr. Justice
Stewart-was at pains to deny that the equal protection clause required that
every vote cast in a state election have an arithmetical impact equal to every
19. Prior to the Revolution, many of the colonies denied the vote to Jews. PrFarrz,
CHURcP H, STATE AND FREm0 80 (1953); W xrw soN, AmeCAN SurFFRAG Fo
PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 1760-1860 16 (1960). The constitutions adopted contemporaneous-
ly with the Revolution, and practice thereunder, tended generally to a more liberal view of
eligibility to vote. See id. at 115. But some elements of religiously oriented political dis-
ability lingered on. Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, in force until 1790,
required members of the state legislature to acknowledge "the Scriptures of the Old and
New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration." 5 THoRPE, A.macXAn CuAnrEns,
CoNsTrrunoNs An ORGANIc LAws 3085. Article X I of the North Carolina Consti-
tution of 1776 denied public office to anyone unwilling to ackmowledge "the being of God
or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New
Testaments... ." Id. at 2793. In 1835, the word "Christian" was substituted for "Protestant."
Id. at 2798-99. In fact, however, a Jew was seated in the North Carolina Legislature in 1803
without substantial difficulty. PFEFFER, op. cit. supra at 126.
20. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Compare PurTz;A, R.cE Azn
REASON-A YAN=E Vizw (1961), an obno-dous, pseudo-scientific attempt to justify the
continued segregation of Negroes.
21. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948).
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other vote cast.2 And yet the majority remanded the case for trial. Why?
Quite obviously because acquiescence in the generalization that a state can so
relate geography and voting strength as "to assure a proper diffusion of
political initiative" can hardly be taken as acquiescence in the proposition that
any geographic "diffusion of political initiative" is a "proper" one.
The dissenters in Baker v. Carr observed that, "Appellants invoke the right
to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and
their votes are counted."23 Is it obtuse to read into this observation a con-
cession that a justiciable controversy would be presented if a state's plan for
"diffusion of political initiative" denied all, or even some, urban communities
any voice in state-wide elections? Would not such a limitation on the suffrage,
properly alleged in a complaint, pose for the Supreme Court a justiciable ques-
tion as to the reasonableness of the limitation, just as in the past the Court has
inquired into the reasonableness of conditioning the right to vote on payment
of a poll tax 2 or satisfaction of a literacy test ?25 And if blanket foreclosure of
the vote in urban constituencies would pose a justiciable question, why would
courts be unable to make a comparable inquiry into arrangements which let the
urbanite cast his ballot but which accorded that ballot only a tenth or a
hundredth the value of the ballot cast by his country cousin?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan have indicated that under
the decided cases there is no "constitutional limitation upon the relative weight
to which the law might properly entitle respective ballots, even in federal elec-
tions. '20 But how can such a proposition of constitutional law have intelligible
content across the board, without examination of the particular community
patterns which might lead a particular state to fashion particular allocations
of voting strength? Perhaps the polity which is Georgia can adduce reasons for
restraining cold-eyed urban domination adequate to explain the gross dis-
parities in voting strength apparently embodied in its "county unit" system. 7
Yet the Court spared Georgia that task when first the system was attacked,
apparently preferring to validate any and all disparities as reflecting what it
had theretofore called "a proper diffusion of political initiative."28 But surely it
22. 369 U.S. at 244-45 (Mr. Justice Douglas) ; id. at 258 (Mr. Justice Clark); id.
at 265-66 (Mr. Justice Stewart).
23. 369 U.S. at 299. By way of footnote, the dissenters added, inter alia, that previous
decisions "do not so much as suggest that there exists a constitutional limitation upon the
relative weight to which the law might properly entitle respective ballots, even in federal
elections." Id. at 299 n.32.
24. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
25. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) ; cf. Davis v. Schnell,
81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
26. See note 23 smpra.
27. See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (dissenting opinion) for a recital
of the asserted inequalities inherent in the "county unit" system.
28. In South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), the Court affirmed dismissal of the com-
plaint, citing Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and MacDougall v. Green, 335
U.S. 281 (1948). It was in the latter case that the Court referred to the state's undoubted
"power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative ... !' Id. at 284.
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is not beyond the wit of judges to fashion a rough calculus for measuring
officially ordained disparities in voting strength against the assigned justifica-
tion, as the Court now will apparently have to do in a new "county unit" case
coming before it.29 Or, in Baker v. Carr itself, perhaps Tennessee can on
remand justify (as it has not seriously attempted to do thus far) not only the
broad pattern of urban-rural variance but the further fact, adverted to by
Mr. Justice Clark, that Tennessee's system "discriminates horizontally, creat-
ing gross disparities between rural areas themselves as well as between urban
areas themselves .... 30
To have continued to dispense with inquiry-to have continued to float the
postulate that any disparities are sound ones-would have perpetuated a triv-
ialization of the equal protection clause. Correlatively, to have continued to
deny the competence of judges to evaluate the reasonableness of these kinds of
community choices seems inconsistent with the trust Americans customarily
repose in their judiciary to construct rules of reason delimiting other funda-
mental community choices, including choices in the realm of voting rights.a'
29. Suggestions as to some of the forms this judicial calculus may take are contained
in Professor Thomas I. Emerson's thoughtful study in this symposium: Malapporlionment
and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64 (1962).
The new "county unit" case is Gray v. Sanders, No. 959, October Term, 1961, probable
jurisdiction noted, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3391 (June 18, 1962). The New York Times, Sept.
30, 1962, p. 74, col. 3, reported the case as follows:
A three-judge Federal District Court tossed out the unit system in the decision to
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. In the popular vote primary-the first in this
century-a moderate, urban candidate, Carl E. Sanders, won the Democratic onin-
ation for Governor, tantamount to election.
And, after the unit system was abandoned for Congressional primaries, too, a
34-year old Atlantan, Charles L. Weltner, ousted a long-time segregationist, Repre-
sentative James C. Davis. Mr. Davis would have won in unit votes.
30. 339 U.S. at 256. This sort of horizontal disparity is also not unique. In Connecti-
cut, for example, the 10th Senatorial District in New Haven has less than half the popula-
tion of the 8th and 9th Districts in the same city, and less than a third the population of
the 1st District in Hartford. New Haven Register, Aug. 19, 1962, sec. 2, p. 2, cols. 3-4.
31. If a case like Baker v. Carr were denominated "political" because it "concerns
matters that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests," Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946), the same could be said of cases testing poll
taxes and literacy qualifications: partisan conflicts between fanner and city dweller are
in the American grain, but so too are those between creditor and debtor classes, and
(as is suggested by the current controversy over the disenfranchisement of thousands of
New York's Puerto Ricans) between native Americans and newcomers not yet literate
in English. Mr. Madison made all this abundantly clear long ago, in THE Feaumsr No.
10. See note 36 infra and the excerpt quoted in the text at that point.
Elaborate inquiry into whether the issues posed in Baker v. Carr are within the
ambit of article ITV's guarantee of a republican form of government seems almost beside
the point. The guarantee clause can be readily understood as a grant of power to Congress
and the President; it need not be turned into a withdrawal of power from the judiciary.
The problem in Baker v. Carr was not whether the "political" branches could act, but
whether in the absence of action by them (except in the sense that the Solicitor General
appeared as amicus curiae on appellants' side of the case), the judiciary could not perform its
ordinary responsibility of enforcing the equal protection clause.
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There are, as the dissenters in Baker v. Carr insisted, some things wrong with
the United States that judges cannot put to rights. The dissenters felt that the
problem of malapportionment belongs in that category: "In this situation, as in
others of like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be
to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like ours,
relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the con-
science of the people's representatives."8 2 But the very heart of the problem
is that the incumbent elective officials who have the power to make or block
remedial laws are themselves not "the people's representatives." They are the
faithful servants of muscular minorities whose continued control over state-
and (though to a lesser extent) national-policy depends upon and will in-
sure eternal viligance against encircling majorities and eternal frustration of
their attempted reforms.3 3 If the Court in Baker v. Carr had affirmed dismissal
of the complaint, the Court would in effect have declared that the only power to
arrest the pervasive systemic disorder of malapportionment lay in the hands
of those who thrive upon the malady. And this would have been an ominous
declaration, for the malady is a grave one, a sclerosis which clogs the law-
making heart of the American body politic.
For what is at stake is the central integrity of the governmental mechanisms
the American people adopted as the means of carrying out the American
experiment. The American people wrote into their Constitution a design for
a new national government, tripartite in form; they also wrote into their Con-
stitution the expectation that the constituent states would maintain their re-
publican institutions through state governments likewise tripartite in form.34
This is not to say that the Constitution postulated identical governmental
structures at national and state levels.',3 It is to say that at each level the
Constitution postulated the idea of a judiciary, the idea of an executive, and-
at the heart of government-the idea of a legislature. They espoused the prin-
ciple of a representative law-making branch, and they did so deliberately, know-
ing its dangers:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his in-
32. 369 U.S. at 270.
33. One of the oft-repeated objections to the American system of judicial review is,
of course, that it saps legislators of the instinct for constitutionalism which would flourish
if their power to make laws were unreviewable. But the history of the malapportionment
problem in general, and the particular Tennessee history (of blithe disregard for Tennes-
see's own constitutional mandate to reapportion at regular intervals) which culminated
in Baker v. Carr, offer little evidence to support the suggestion that legislators freed of
judicial supervision would grow into man-sized and responsible participants in the pro-
cesses of government.
34. U.S. CONST., art. I, sees. 2, 3, 4; art. II, sec. 1; art. IV, sees. 3, 4; arts, V & VI.
35. Or even that the three branches of state governments must maintain the precise
distribution of functions prescribed by the Constitution on the national level. Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902); cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256-57
(1957) (concurring opinion) ; and see Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgilent and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 67 YALE L.J. 304, 314 (1957).
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tegrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to
bo both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not in-
deed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators
but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?...
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these dashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public
good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view
indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the im-
mediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of
another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction can-
not be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of con-
trolling its effects.3 6
One of the beneficent devices for "controlling its effects" which the people
of the United States ultimately fashioned was the equal protection clause. As
Mr. justice Jackson remarked:
Invocation of the equal protection clause does not disable any govern-
mental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that
the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. I regard it
as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must
exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants
except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which officials would im-
pose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing
opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure
that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation 3 7
To insist "that laws be equal in operation," by uprooting those which are
not, is a prudent exercise of judicial power. It also seems prudent to take those
prophylactic measures which will minimize legislative tendencies to enact laws
of a different kind. To require states, and the United States, to conform their
legislative structures more closely to the idea of a legislature is such a measure.
Baker v. Carr should expedite the process.
36. THE FxEDmIMST No. 10, at 56-57 (Earle ed. 1937) (Madison).
37. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (concurring
opinion).
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